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Hegel, Adorno and the Origins Immanent Criticism  1
!
1.  The German writer and critic Gotthold Ephraim Lessing recommends a little maxim by 
Lactantius as a guide to criticism: ‘primus sapientiae gradus est, falsa intelligere; secundus, vera 
cognoscere.’ One should, Lessing wrote, “first seek out someone with whom to argue; one there-
by gradually finds one’s way into the question at issue, and the rest will follow of itself.”   Al2 -
though there is discussion (or at least talk) of immanent criticism by philosophers of quite differ-
ent persuasions, working in separate areas and in different traditions of philosophy, almost all of 
them agree somewhat surprisingly on the same story about the its origins. The story is so wide-
spread, it should be familiar to anyone who knows the literature.  It is that Hegel invented imma3 -
nent criticism, that Marx later developed it, and that the various members of the Frankfurt 
School, particularly Adorno, refined it in various ways, and that they are all paradigmatic practi-
tioners of immanent criticism.  Continuity is the story from Hegel to Adorno, so let us call this 4
the Continuity Thesis.   5
There are four different claims in the Continuity Thesis that interest me. 
i. Hegel is the originator of immanent criticism.  6
ii. Hegel’s dialectical method is that of immanent criticism. 
iii. Adorno practices immanent criticism and endorses the term as a description of his 
practice. 
iv Adorno’s dialectical method is fundamentally Hegelian. 
The first two claims concern Hegel, and the second two concern Adorno’s theory and its relation 
to Hegel. As is usually the case with such stories that are supposed to help us make rough and 
ready sense of the history of philosophy, the truth is more complicated. In my view, though, this 
particular story is more of a hindrance than a help, and is in need of substantial revision.  
!
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2.  Before examining the thesis in more detail, we must say something about the concept of 
criticism, and of immanent criticism, whose putative origins are in question. Concisely formulat-
ed, to criticize immanently is to criticize an object ‘on its own terms.’ This is how ‘immanent 
criticism’ is usually presented, and how it is summarized in the relevant entry in Ritter’s His-
torisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie: "the judgment of historical epochs, cultures, literary texts 
and so forth 'according to their own standards.’“  Concision is commendable, but is only to be 7
had at the cost of considerable compression. So it will help to unpack the idea. 
Let’s begin with the component notion of criticism, which is itself a multifaceted concept.  There 8
are actually seven facets worthy of comment, but I shall restrict myself to brief remarks on the 
four features most relevant to the present discussion. Criticism is a judgment (a), that is in-
formed, discriminating and rational, which is always evaluative and sometimes normative (b) 
and nearly always negative (c) of an appropriate object of criticism, in the light of some standard 
(d) for a practical aim or purpose.  
(a) A criticism is a judgment, which may be implicit or explicit. It need not take the 
grammatical form ‘s is p’ and need not even be vocalized. Throwing a stone at the window 
of a bank, or burning a flag, are forms of judgment. 
(b)Criticisms are evaluative judgements in the broadest sense. Some are also normative, in the 
sense that they appeal to norms (sometimes to moral norms) and thus have implications for 
what one ought to do.  9
(c) Criticism is almost invariably negative. We can see this in the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of criticism, which is: “1. The action of criticizing, or passing judgement upon 
the qualities or merits of anything; esp. the passing of unfavourable judgement; fault-
finding, censure” as evidence that criticism is virtually always negative. It is equally true 
however, that, in principle, criticism can be entirely positive.  It is true of art criticism and 10
film criticism for example, although the same holds in principle, albeit much more rarely 
in practice, for social criticism.  So it is certainly not a platitude that criticism is nearly 11
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always negative. Indeed, it is a good question why in practice most criticism tends to be 
so.   12
(d)Criticism, as a form of implicit or explicit judgment, has recourse to some kind of 
standard. For criticism is not just the passing of any old judgment, but of an ‘informed’  
‘discriminating’ and ‘rational’ judgment, and as such it rests on an appropriate standard.  
This idea dates back to 18th century notions about judgments of taste and beauty, but it is 
also firmly part of the commonplace view of immanent criticism.  
3.  The above characterization of the concept of criticism, as a negative evaluative judge-
ment made on the basis of some standard can help us to grasp what it is about criticism that 
makes it immanent. What makes a criticism immanent is that the standard of criticism belongs to 
or inheres in (in a suitably specified sense) the object of criticism. This still leaves a lot of ques-
tions open, but I shall pass over these because here I am merely setting out the commonplace 
view of immanent criticism. On this commonplace view, criticism, by virtue of being immanent, 
exhibits certain virtues. Immanent criticism is supposed to be: firstly, meaningful, contentful, rel-
evant, or applicable; secondly, persuasive, credible, and convincing; and thirdly, effective, practi-
cal, or useful. In other words, it is widely accepted that immanent criticism delivers three differ-
ent kinds of goods; cognitive and epistemic goods; psychological and dialogical goods; and prac-
tical instrumental goods.  
Now part of the widespread view is that immanent criticism is different from and opposed to an-
other way of doing criticism usually called ‘transcendent criticism’.  It is claimed, virtually 13
across the board, that there are a corresponding list of vices that criticism that is not immanent, 
but rather transcendent, exhibits; namely it is: first, meaningless or empty; irrelevant, inapplica-
ble; second, unpersuasive, unconvincing; and third, ineffective, impractical, and useless.  In ad14 -
dition transcendent criticism is, it is claimed, apt to be paternalistic, elitist, better knowing; ma-
nipulative, imposed by force, oppressive, imperialist. In making these observations I am simply 
collating and curating some familiar claims made by numerous authors in different times and 
places. For our purposes here it is unnecessary to drill down into the detail and resolve such 
questions as whether, for example, immanent criticism is opposed to or inclusive of moral criti-
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cism. It suffices to note that the commonplace view of immanent criticism is redolent with as-
sumptions about merits of immanent criticism and the demerits of non-immanent, transcendent 
criticism.    15
!
Hegel and the Origins of Immanent Criticism 
4.  Let us now turn to the Continuity Thesis and in particular to the first two claims 
concerning Hegel. It is striking, given how widely shared the story of its Hegelian origins is, that 
the term ‘immanent criticism’ is nowhere to be found in Hegel’s corpus (or Marx’s come to that.) 
Hegel was methodologically self-aware, and took great care with his philosophical 
terminology. Not only did he not call his own philosophy or philosophical method ‘immanent 
criticism,’ he did not and would not call any of his mature philosophies works of ‘criticism’. Of 
course, some commentators even recoil at the suggestion there is such a thing as a philosophical 
method in Hegel, on the grounds that Hegel is loath to construe his own dialectic as a formal 
method or “lifeless schema” that can be carried out on any content, because, as he puts it in the 
Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, scientific cognition “demands surrender to the life of the 
object”, where a lifeless method would be “merely the reflection of the cognitive process away 
from the content and back into itself” (PS 32/W 3, 51). Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hegel 
had a method, the one he labels in the Science of Logic the “absolute method of knowing” (SL 
28/W 5, 17).  And one can describe this method more or less aptly, as Michael Forster does: “it is 
a method of exposition in which each category in turn is shown to be implicitly self-
contradictory and to develop necessarily into the next (thus forming a continuously connected 
hierarchical series culminating in an all-embracing category that Hegel calls the Absolute 
Idea).”  Forster’s description captures the structure and movement from one shape of 16
consciousness to the next Hegel’s Phenomenology, and the dynamic of Hegel’s Logic in the 
chain of transitions from one category to another.  
Anyway, call it a method or not, Hegel has detailed and determinate ideas about how to do 
philosophy, and he refused to call any of the approaches that he developed in his mature work 
‘criticism’.   He called them simply “Science” [Wissenschaft]: in the case of the Phenomenology 17
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of Spirit 1807, which was the first part of “The System of Science”, “The Science of Logic” 
1812-16, and “The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Science” of 1817/1832. Hegel reserves the 
term “criticism” and “critical philosophy” exclusively for the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and 
Jacobi whose methods and approaches to philosophy he rejects. Furthermore, famously, in the 
preface to his Elements of the Philosophy of Right he counsels that the properly philosophical 
task is “to comprehend what is” rather than to “instruct the state on how it ought to be” (PR 23/
W7, 27-8). The proper task of Science, as Hegel understands it, is that of traditional metaphysics, 
to comprehend what is. So if  criticism “an informed, negative evaluative judgment of an 
appropriate object of criticism” and is immanent when the standard of criticism is internal to its 
object, then it looks like Hegel denies that the proper task of philosophy is criticism immanent or 
not: its proper task is that allotted to it by classical metaphysics, to comprehend being.  
In the light of all this, we can see that thesis i. is false, if it implies that Hegel coined the term 
“immanent criticism” or even that he was the first to develop a conception of ‘immanent 
criticism’ if developing a ‘conception’ implies he used the term or welcomed it as a description 
of his philosophical practice. 
!
5.  If Hegel did not use the term ‘immanent criticism,’ and a fortiori did not invent the term, 
we might ask who did. It is a hard question to answer definitively. The answer given in the entry 
on  ‘immanente Kritik’ in the Historisches Wörterbuch, which is usually an impeccable source, is 
that the earliest recorded use of the term in German occurs in Walter Benjamin’s 1919 doctoral 
dissertation on ‘The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism’.  Although this puts the 18
first use of the term suspiciously late, it has a certain plausibility. Schlegel’s idea of criticism 
bears some striking resemblances to the commonplace view of immanent criticism. On 
Schlegel’s conception criticism is, first, not based on any external rule. (Schlegel presumably has 
in mind rules such as those of French neo-classical drama, the unities of time, place and action 
supposedly derived from Aristotle, which came to be treated as norms governing the composition 
of tragedies.) Second, it does not consist in a judgment or evaluative assessment of the art 
work.  On the basis of this evidence some scholars infer that the term (and the idea) worked its 19
!5
way from Benjamin into Frankfurt School critical theory, which is also plausible since Adorno 
was familiar with Benjamin’s thesis, even though he did not share the Benjamin’s enthusiasm for 
the early Romantics.   20
Unfortunately, almost everything in this story is wrong. As Adorno put it: “Truth is Objective, 
not plausible”  There are uses of the term ‘immanent criticism’ as early as the 1840s. For exam21 -
ple, F. A Trendelenburg, a trenchant critic of Hegel’s logic claims in his book, Die logishe Frage 
in Hegel’s System (1843), that all his various objections to Hegel’s Phenomenology “stem from 
an immanent criticism of the concept, to use the terminology of the school, from its own de-
mands claims and consequences.” Trendelenburg’s phrase “um mit der Schule zu reden” which 
refers back to the noun phrase “immanent criticism of the concept” suggests that this is current 
jargon among the Hegel school.  Indeed it was. Karl Rosenkranz, the pupil of Hegel, in the in22 -
troduction to his History of Kant’s Philosophy asserts that Hegel “proved the interrelation of the 
categories on their own terms, and determined the value of each one by means of an immanent 
criticism of the progress of the Idea.”   23
Here are two examples of the term ‘immanent criticism’ being used nearly 80 years before Ben-
jamin’s doctoral dissertation. (Benjamin, even as he gives the term his own distinctive twist,  
must have known that the term was current in the latter half of the 19th Century.) Notice also that 
it is being used in two distinct senses. In the first example, the term is used in the slender, com-
monplace sense. Trendelenburg, who appears to endorse the term and use it himself, most as-
suredly does not equate it with Hegel’s dialectical method, which he repudiates. He criticizes 
Hegel for violating the principles of Aristotelian logic, which Hegel himself claims to accept, and 
thereby refutes its claim to be ‘scientific’.   In the second example, Rosenkranz uses the term in 24
a much thicker sense which he explicitly equates with the dialectical method by which Hegel de-
duces the categories through the development of the absolute Idea. These two different senses: 
the slender commonplace sense and the thick Hegelian sense, are distinct, for the former notion 
does not presuppose Hegel’s conception of philosophy and can be held by any non-Hegelian, 
while the latter does and cannot. 
!6
6.  In many ways the more interesting and substantial question concerns not the origin of the 
term, but the origin of the idea, which may not be coeval. It is well known, for example, that 
Hegel on numerous occasions  endorses the idea that criticism is the better for being based on the 
opponent’s presuppositions. Take the following passage from the Science of Logic: 
[T]he refutation must not come from the outside, that is it must not proceed from assump-
tions lying outside the system in question and which it does not accord with (denen es 
nicht entspricht). The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and 
meet him on his own ground. No advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else 
and meeting him where he is not.  25
This passage is about how to construct a self-grounding system of absolute philosophy. But it 
also propounds a version of the commonplace idea: the best way of refuting a philosophical 
system such as Spinoza’s, Hegel claims, is to do so on its own grounds. So certainly Hegel has 
the commonplace idea of ‘immanent criticism.’ And even if he does not call it ‘immanent 
criticism’ he endorses it as a good method of philosophical criticism. Nevertheless, this does not 
support the claim that Hegel invented that idea. He was not the first to come up with it. Indeed, it 
was a philosophical commonplace in his day, and long before, that argument is the more 
successful at convincing people for being based on premises avowed by the opponent, or on the 
premises of the opponent’s philosophical system. It might be claimed for example that this is the 
characteristic feature of the Socratic method of argumentation, and that therefore ‘immanent 
criticism’ in the commonplace sense originates with Socrates.   26
7.  But ‘immanent criticism’ as we have seen was also understood in the much richer sense 
as designating Hegel’s dialectical method, the method that Hegel calls Science. It is of course 
much more plausible, not to say uncontroversial, to claim that Hegel originated the idea of 
‘immanent criticism’ in that sense. All of which brings us to thesis ii, and the various difficulties 
that it poses.  
Let us note, though, that thesis i cannot be rescued by interpreting it as a thesis about ‘immanent 
criticism’ in the rich Hegelian sense. For, once the notion of ‘immanent criticism’ is used to refer 
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to Hegel’s dialectical method, then it turns out that Hegel is being proclaimed to be the inventor 
only of the Hegelian dialectic, which no-one disputes. In other words, this interpretation salvages 
the truth of thesis i. only at the cost of rendering it uninteresting. 
 Still, the question of origins aside, it is well worth examining whether there is any merit in the 
claim that Hegel’s dialectical method is that of ‘immanent criticism’. We have already seen that 
some interpreters of Hegel, like his follower Karl Rosenkranz, do claim that Hegel’s dialectical 
method takes the form of an immanent criticism of the concept. And in more more recent times, 
several prominent Hegel scholars have made similar arguments.   The claims being made here, 27
on pain of being uninformative, must be claims about ‘immanent criticism’ in the slender 
commonplace sense. But what are we to make of the argument that Hegel’s dialectical method 
consists in immanent criticism in the slender commonplace sense? Or perhaps  the argument is 
that the slender idea of immanent criticism is an essential feature of the Hegelian method, along 
with other more substantial components. To answer such questions we need to look in more 
detail at Hegel’s dialectical method.  
!
8. Hegel calls the microstructure of the dialectical transition between shapes of 
consciousness or concepts an ‘Aufheben’ or ‘sublating’, a transition which he explains thus: “Das 
Aufheben exhibits it true double meaning which we have observed in the negative: it negates and 
at the same time preserves.”  Taking Hegel’s description as the last word one might think that 28
this transition is merely a concurrence of change and persistence somewhat like what Aristotle 
calls ‘nature’ in the Physics.   But this is not so. Hegel’s Auf-heben is also crucially an Up-29
lifting. The prefix ‘auf’ meaning ‘on,’ ‘up’ or ‘upon’ is not idle. The transition from shape of 
consciousness (or category in the Logic) to another involves a necessary movement upwards to 
something better and higher. I’m going to call this upwards movement dialectical ascent, though 
one has to be careful with that designation.  
I don’t mean by that an erotic ascent à la Plato, whereby lower forms of thought seek the higher 
for the sake of the higher.  There is no Platonic heaven where the ideas are. If anything the 30
ascent in Hegel is driven from below. What makes the upwards movement necessary, according 
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to Hegel, is the internal contradiction in the initial category, a contradiction that it has merely by 
virtue of being finite (W 8, 172). 
We can see what Hegel calls the contradiction in the finite in the very first transition of Hegel’s 
Logic: Being, Nothing: and Becoming (W 8, 181). Hegel divides the dialectic into two moments. 
The first is the “dialectic,” strictly speaking, which is the moment of the “self-sublation of a 
finite category” and its “passing over into its contrary”.  This is what happens in the case of pure 
being, which because of its indeterminate immediacy passes into its opposite, nothing, which is 
what it is. The second moment is the “speculative” or “positive-rational” moment, which 
represents the unity of the previously opposed categories. Both the first moment, the dialectical 
moment strictly speaking, the passing of one finite category into its contrary, and the second, 
speculative moment, where the opposition is reconfigured as a higher unity, are essential to 
Hegel’s ‘dialectical method’. My claim that there is an ascent is supposed to  rule out that this a 
process of collapse and recuperation. Rather the transition marks a gain in complexity, 
refinement, stability, and coherence on the initial category and thus marks epistemological and 
ontological progress.  A dialectical transition without uplift and ascent, without these gains is 
simply not dialectical in Hegel’s sense. 
In its macrostructure too, Hegel’s dialectic is, just as much as its ancient predecessors, an ascent, 
in Hegel’s case, an ascent towards the end of absolute knowing. Hegel is a teleologist of the 
modern world and for him, just as for Aristotle, the final end is the highest and the best.  31
However in Aristotle (as in Plato) dialectical ascent is a movement from concretion and 
particularity towards increasing abstraction and universality, whereas the movement in Hegel is a 
d evelopment from abstract particularity to concrete universality (for example the 32
Phenomenology of Spirit traces a path from sense-certainty to absolute knowing.) And indeed, 
Hegel’s teleological metaphysics is structured very differently to Aristotle’s. Hegel’s system is 
not pyramidal in form, but circular. In macrostructure the chain of transitions between logical 
categories (or shapes of consciousness) forms a self-completing circle. Thought thus moves 
onwards and upwards, and finally comes to itself in the absolute identity of subject and object, 
where it thinks itself and nothing but itself. So a dialectical transition in Hegel’s sense, qua 
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‘speculative’ or ‘scientific,’ is not just a shift upward (in the sense that it is a cognitive gain), for 
that might be part of a limitless bad infinity based on the elimination of error; it is also a step in a 
development toward the end, i.e. a moment in a self-completing circle. But this is just to say that 
Hegel’s dialectic is essentially dependent on his systematic Logic and Metaphysics, and it is this 
that makes it superior, he claims, to the kind of sophistic, skeptical dialectic, which absent the 
speculative moment remains stuck as it were on the first level, and which he dismisses as “a 
subjective see-saw system of ratiocination to and fro”  (W 8, 172). 
The upshot of all this is that, if we look closely both at the micro and macrostructure of Hegel’s 
dialectic, we see that epistemological cum ontological ascent are essential to it, and this ascent 
has to be thought of both as movement away from error (or falsity) and progress towards an 
end.  33
!
9. As one would expect, much the same point can be made in respect of Hegel’s doctrine 
of determinate negation. Determinate negation involves two moments. There is the initial 
negativity, which consists, as we have seen, in the object’s or the category’s finitude.    34
Recall that for Hegel there is only one absolute spirit and one absolute idea, and it is only here 
that the object truly and perfectly corresponds to its concept. There is, consequently, an important 
contrasting sense in which every finite thing, and every finite category is false.  This is the first 35
moment. Ontological negativity or falsity resides in the fact that each finite individual thing is 
only what it is by virtue of its relations to other things, which it is not. Conceptual negativity 
consists in the fact that each finite individual concept (or object) only means what it does by 
virtue of its relations to all the other concepts (objects) from which it differs.   36
The second moment is the negating power of thought. Thought proceeds negatively by bringing 
to light the non-correspondence of the object and its concept, by showing that the object, qua 
finite, fails fully to instantiate the concept. This failure forces thinking to come up with a new 
and more adequate concept of the object. This process of refinement is not a one way adjustment 
of thought to thing; rather, Hegel claims, “as the concept changes, so too does the object, for it 
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essentially belonged to this object” (PS 54/W 3, 78). The new concept preserves and 
reconfigures elements of the former concept at a higher level of adequacy. Moreover, something 
new results from this process, namely a new concept and a new conceptually determined object. 
Each determinate negation, the negating power of thought on the inherent negativity of finite 
categories, and the ontological negativity of finite things, yields a positive result. 
The dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content, or because its 
result is in truth not the empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain 
determinations, which are contained in the result…” (W 8, 177). 
So, determinate negation involves not just a cancellation and a preservation of something that 
already obtains, but also the production of something new, higher and better.   37
Hegel’s point of contrast is abstract negation a process by which something is dismissed, as if 
destroyed. Michael Rosen uses the nice example of the wiping clean of a blackboard, no matter 
what is written on it. Determinate negation differs in two respects. Unlike abstract negation 
determinate negation adapts itself to, and engages with, its objects; and unlike abstract negation 
it produces something new, like the chiseling away of marble (to use the Plotinian metaphor for 
negation) which always leaves a new shape. Rosen is quite right to insist that the productivity of 
negation, the positive result, is present from the first moment, not isolated in the second 
negation, the negation of the negation.  However, we must add something to Rosen’s account, 38
for negation can be thought of as adaptive and productive, always engaging with its objects and 
giving rise to new shapes, and yet as a moment of what Hegel thinks of as a bad infinity. As I see 
it, the positive result is not just the production of a new shape, but, crucially, a gain in 
determinacy, only because it is both movement away from error and a movement towards the 
end, the true, or the absolute idea. There can be no determinate negation, and hence no Hegelian 
dialectic, without uplift and ascent, and no uplift and ascent without Hegel’s whole system. What 
a thing is in truth is unfolded and developed in the context of its relation to all other things, and 
can properly be known only in its full development.  The crowning moment of the logic of the 39
concept is the absolute idea: “the true content is nothing but the whole system, whose 
development we have all this while been observing” (W 6 389). 
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!10. Our exposition has shown that Hegel’s dialectic and its component ideas, ‘Aufhebung’ 
and ‘determinate negation,’ are freighted with the much more heavyweight philosophical and 
ontological commitments of Hegel’s absolute idealism.  In the final analysis, both notions 40
depend essentially on Hegel’s systematic Logic and Metaphysics, and they cannot be detached 
from this context without losing the specific sense that Hegel gives them.  
Now it almost goes without saying that this heavyweight theory is no part of the slender 
commonplace idea of immanent criticism, which claims only that the critical judgment be based 
on a standard internal to its object. There is indeed a parallel with how Hegel thinks of negation 
(both first and second negation) as adaptive to its object, and this feature of Hegelian negation 
might be considered to be part of the slender idea immanent criticism. For criticism that is 
immanent also adapts to its object in that it is based on a standard inherent in the object. But the 
parallel obtains between negation and criticism, and it to be expected because what is true of 
negation, is also true of immanent criticism qua negative evaluative judgment. However, the 
further ideas that negation produces a positive result, and the ideas of uplift and ascent that are 
essential to Hegel’s dialectic and its component notions of Aufhebung and determinate negation 
form no part of the commonplace idea.  
!
11.  How does this inquiry into Hegel’s dialectical method bear on the first two claims of the 
Continuity Thesis? Well we can now see that: 
i. Hegel is not the inventor or originator of immanent criticism in any interesting sense. The 
slender, commonplace idea of immanent criticism, dates back at least to Socrates.  
ii. Hegel’s dialectical method cannot be reduced to the commonplace idea of immanent crit-
icism. That would give a Bowdlerized account of his philosophical method.  
The Hegel side of the Continuity Thesis looks prima facie plausible because the following rather 
different and more modest claims are true. Hegel has the concept of immanent criticism in the 
sense that he subscribes to the commonplace idea. He puts this notion into practice in his 
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criticisms of other philosophical positions. Finally, one feature of his account of negation in 
general, holds for the richer idea of immanent criticism understood as a negative evaluative 
judgment of an appropriate object on the basis of a standard inherent in it. 
!
Adorno and Immanent Criticism 
!
12.  Let us turn to the Adorno side of the continuity thesis, and examine its two claims. 
Adorno welcomes immanent criticism as a description of his critical theory (CT iii). 
Adorno often welcomes the description of his own philosophy as ‘immanent criticism.’ He en-
dorses the view that criticism is the better for being immanent and likes to present himself as an 
immanent critic. Adorno writes “The dialectical procedure is immanent criticism,” and he ap-
provingly cites the very passage of Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’ cited above, which begins ““[T]he 
refutation must not come from the outside…” where Hegel endorses the commonplace idea of 
immanent criticism.   Consistently with his conceiving his own approach to be one of immanent 41
criticism, Adorno can be found repudiating transcendent criticism. 
It was transcendent and not immanent critique that clings rigidly to that standpoint, 
whose very fixity and arbitrariness of which, philosophy turned against in equal measure. 
Transcendent critique sympathizes with authority in its very form…” (HTS 146/GS 5 
374). 
We have seen that there are two distinct conceptions of immanent criticism: the slender 
commonplace notion, and the thick Hegelian notion, which occur in the literature from at least 
1840 onwards. Adorno does not distinguish between these. Rather, he conflates the two. 
Nonetheless, they are distinct and Claim iii of the Continuity Thesis can refer to either notion. 
So we must first ask whether Adorno embraces the slender commonplace view. The answer to 
that question is: Yes, for the most part he does. For example, in an essay written in 1949 he 
claims: “The procedure is immanent, because it takes the objective idea of a work, whether it is 
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sociological, musical or literary, and ‘confronts it with the norms which it has crystallized 
itself.’” (P 31/GS 10.1 26) Secondly, we must also ask whether Adorno conceives his own 
approach to philosophy as immanent criticism in the thick Hegelian sense. The answer to this 
question is, for the most part yes.  In “Cultural Criticism and Society” written in 1949, Adorno 
defends “the immanent procedure (of cultural criticism - GF) as the more essentially dialectical”  
in a passage where he treats ‘immanent criticism’ as equivalent with Hegel’s dialectic (P 32/ GS 
10.1, 27). Later, in the Dedication to Minima Moralia he claims that his method was “schooled 
in Hegel” (MM 16/GS, 4, 14.) Given that this work is explicitly anti-systematic, one infers that 
by ‘method” here he means the dialectic. 
Moreover, there is a lot of indirect evidence pointing to the same conclusion. At the same time as 
embracing ‘immanent criticism’ he welcomes Hegelian notions of ‘Aufhebung’ and ‘determinate 
negation’ as descriptions of his own critical theory, as he does in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
where he avers that the “adjustment to reality and adaptation to power”, that critical theory 
opposes, are processes “of liquidation rather than sublation, of formal rather than determinate 
negation.” (DE 205/GS 3, 231) Elsewhere he writes: “Insofar as philosophy determines, contra 
Hegel, the negativity of the whole, philosophy ultimately fulfills the postulate of determinate 
negation, which is the position” (HTS 87/GS, 5, 324-325). Not Hegel, who tries to develop the 
concrete universal conceptually by means of it, Adorno suggests, but rather he, who repudiates 
Hegel’s system, is the true inheritor of determinate negation. In brief, Adorno thinks of his own 
approach as an immanent criticism of Hegel. But where Trendelenburg, who explicitly repudiates 
Hegel’s dialectic and his system, conducts an immanent criticism of Hegel in the slender 
commonplace sense, Adorno does something quite different: He attempts to rescue Hegel’s 
dialectic from the system. For example, he says in the conclusion to Hegel Three Studies, that 
“Hegel violates his own conception of the dialectic, which should be defended against 
him…” (HTS 147/GS, 5 375). In other words, Adorno’s conceives of his own philosophy, as an 
immanent criticism of Hegel in the rich sense.  
This view of Hegel’s immanent criticism, as a version of Hegel’s dialectic, is widely shared 
among Adorno scholars. Brian O’Connor claims that Hegel’s method is a version of Hegel’s 
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dialectic qua immanent criticism, one that deploys the notion of ‘determinate negation’.  Rahel 42
Jaeggi, claims outright that “Adorno’s negativism is a dialectical negativism in the tradition of 
immanent critique (in the strong, Hegelian sense).  43
!
13.  So Adorno at various places embraces immanent criticism in both senses and conceives 
of his own approach as immanent criticism. That said, even if we confine our consideration to 
Adorno’s explicit statements on the matter, the evidence about whether Adorno does (never mind 
whether he should) embrace the approach immanent criticism his own is messier and more con-
flicted than these interpretations would suggest. In an important essay written in 1949 Adorno 
writes: “The alternatives - either calling culture as a whole into question from outside under the 
general concept of ideology, or confronting a culture with the norms that it has crystallised out of 
itself, cannot be recognized by critical theory. To insist on the choice between immanence and 
transcendence is a relapse into the traditional logic which was the object of Hegel’s polemic 
against Kant” (P 31/ GS10.1, 25). This looks like an acknowledgement that immanent criticism 
taken alone will not do the job that a critical theory of society asks of it, and has to be supple-
mented by some form of transcendent criticism.  
In Hegel: Three Studies Adorno makes the claim that the essays there are preparations “for a re-
vised conception of the dialectic”(HTS xxxvi). This raises the questions of in what respects, and 
how far, is Adorno’s dialectic revised, and of what relation the revised (negative) dialectic has 
with Hegel’s? It leaves open whether these revisions are so radical as to break completely with 
the Hegelian dialectic. 
From around 1950, I suggest, Adorno is increasingly troubled by the notion of immanent criti-
cism. He is also increasingly preoccupied by forms of transcendence, as is evidenced by the 
‘theological’ images of transcendence, redemption, and utopia that come to leaven his later writ-
ings. Indeed, he is even tempted by the possibility of a transcendent criticism of society. Adorno 
writes in Minima Moralia: “The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the face 
of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would represent themselves from the 
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standpoint of redemption” (MM247/GS 4, 283). Somewhat later, in Negative Dialectics, he 
claims that ‘No light falls on people and things, in which transcendence is not reflected” (ND 
404-5/GS 6, 396). In Probleme der Moralphilosophie, he writes in praise of the sublimity and 
infinity of Kant’s moral law and remarks approvingly that “A philosophy like Kant’s…evidently 
does not repeat what occurs in social reality, but has the tendency to level criticism at existing 
society and to hold out to it another image of the possible, or an imageless image of the possible” 
(PDM 224/PMP 151). Only the last of these is an explicit endorsement of the virtue of transcen-
dent criticism, but the assertion that philosophy must contemplate things from the standpoint of 
redemption, and attempt to understand this world in the light of transcendence nevertheless sit ill 
with the assumptions that he (or his philosophical method) is at bottom Hegelian, and that his 
method is that of ‘immanent criticism’ on either conception of it. 
Although such passages are less frequent than others where Adorno is happy to play up the 
Hegelian origins of his thought, and to endorse immanent criticism, they are no less important. 
They are deeply rooted in his thought. For this reason, Andrew Buchwalter has gone so far as to 
argue that Adorno’s use of the terminology of ‘immanent criticism’ is a sleight of hand, since “he 
embraces a concept of immanence that is little more than a code-word for transcendence.”  44
Buchwalter makes two claims. He concludes, controversially, that Adorno is (like Hegel!) an ex-
ponent of transcendent critique. But he also allows that Adorno practices immanent critique, for 
he rejects the idea that criticism if it is not immanent, must be transcendent, and argues that 
Adorno’s considered view is that criticism must be both.  
I don’t agree with Buchwalter’s conclusions, though his interpretation has the merit of being sen-
sitive to discrepant textual evidence and lines of thought that subscribers to the Continuity Thesis 
ignore or downplay. In my view, transcendent criticism is conceptually opposed to immanent 
criticism in the commonplace sense. The two cannot be combined. Moreover, transcendent criti-
cism as it is normally conceived, is not such as can be incorporated into immanent criticism in 
the rich Hegelian sense either, because transcendent criticism is incompatible with Hegelian 
negation, and determinate negation in particular.  Hence, Buchwalter’s brave attempt to find a 
overall interpretation which accounts for all the conflicting evidence, won’t wash.  
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By contrast my interpretative claim is more modest. I neither claim to be able to identify a point 
where Adorno makes a clean break with the notion of immanent criticism that he had hitherto 
endorsed, and switches to transcendent criticism instead; nor do I attribute to Adorno a hybrid 
conception of criticism that is both immanent and transcendent.  My argument is just that from 45
about 1950 onwards, Adorno’s begins to doubt the viability of immanent criticism (on either 
conceptions of it) as an approach to critical social theory, and that these doubts move him to 
problematize a the conception of criticism that he had hitherto somewhat naively endorsed, and 
to explore alternatives to it. However, he does not do this consistently. And he does not manage 
to work out an adequate answer to the problem. 
!
14. So what are the reasons that shake Adorno’s confidence in the virtues of immanent criti-
cism? They are two fold. The first is that Adorno becomes sensitive to the implications of his di-
agnosis of social reality as pervasively evil, that is, to a view of society as a single integrated sys-
tem that is completely denuded of worthwhile ends, and fully instrumentalized, such that no part 
of it is immune from complicity with forms of domination that reached their abominable culmi-
nation in the Final Solution, and that, in his view, persist also in post-war civil society.   I call 46
this position austere negativism. The diagnosis is set out vividly in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1944) and is the backdrop to Minima Moralia (1951). In that book it is expressed in hyperbolic 
aphoristic pronouncements such as:   
There is no right living in the false life... 
The whole is the untrue… 
There is nothing innocuous left…  
In my view, these should be read these as literally true statements about what Adorno considers 
to be an actually existing, though extreme, state of affairs (MM 18, 32, 25). The same line of 
thinking occurs in Negative Dialectics (1963) in the idea that the “context of immanence” just is 
the “context of delusion” namely the very context from which critical theory has to break free 
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(ND 406/GS 6 393). If society, as Adorno maintains, is a self-maintaining whole, and if it is also 
pervasively and irredeemably evil; if nothing in it is free from complicity with the atrocities 
which have taken place in its midst, then the idea that it contains reliable standards of criticism, 
however conceived, has to be abandoned. To the extent that they are integrated into the context 
of immanence, standards of criticism, whatever they are, are not transcendent enough. They are 
not capable of pointing beyond existing relations to a society that, were it to be realized, would 
be completely different to, and better than, the presently existing one. To the extent that they be-
long to the object of criticism – society – they are continuous with it and contaminated by it. In 
which case they are not the appropriate standards for a critical theory of society. Adorno correct-
ly concludes that:  
The limit of immanent criticism is that the law of the context of immanence is one with 
the delusion that has to be overcome. (ND182/GS 6, 183) 
In such passages, it seems to me Adorno clearly acknowledges that given austere negativism, a 
merely immanent criticism of society will not do: for it will not realize the aim of critical theory.  
I reiterate that austere negativism puts paid both to the slender commonplace idea of immanent 
criticism, and to the thick Hegelian one.  The former idea must go, because standards of criticism 
by virtue of their being inherent in a radically and pervasively evil society are eo ipso unsuitable 
as a basis for that society. It is somewhat harder to see why the idea of immanent criticism as 
Hegelian dialectic must go. For one might think that the capacity of determinate negation to pro-
duce something new, to transform the object of criticism in the process of negating what exists, is 
exactly what Adorno needs, given his dire social diagnosis. A moment’s reflection shows that this 
won’t work, however. For, as we saw, in Hegel the dialectic succeeds in producing something 
new and better, just because it goes to work on the rational in the actual, but the inherence of the 
rational in the actual is exactly what is ruled out by austere negativism, by the view of society as 
a pervasively evil social totality. Austere negativism rules out the possibility of critical theory’s 
deploying Hegelian determinate negation. 
!
!18
15.  The second set of reasons for Adorno’s loss of confidence in immanent criticism (int eh 
rich Hegelian sense) has to do with his criticism of Hegel. Although, when polemicizing against 
various different forms of ‘positivism,’ neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology Adorno 
is wont to emphasize the continuity and the affinity between his way of thinking and Hegel’s dia-
lectic, when he reflects on Hegel’s philosophy a different and more fractured picture emerges.    47
Essentially, Adorno levels two sets of objection against Hegel. The first are Hegel-logical objec-
tions.  For example, Adorno criticizes Hegel’s Begriffslogik for failing to live up to its own prom-
ise of conceiving of concrete universality. By the ‘concrete universal,’ Hegel means a universal 
that is not the result of an abstraction (by the subject) away from all particulars, and which re-
mains distinct from and opposed to those particulars, in the way (he believes) empiricists or 
Kantian idealists might hold. Hegel calls the latter ‘abstract universals’.  By contrast, the ‘con48 -
crete universal’ results from and consists in the self-particularization of the universal, its immer-
sion in the particulars that instantiate it and its inseparability from them.  Hegel’s claim is that 49
the concrete universal, unlike the abstract universal, does not exist apart from and at the expense 
of particulars, but in and through the particulars. The universal does not subsume and subordi-
nate particulars but does justice to them in its development by elevating them to their truth. 
Moreover, this development, Hegel claims, takes place through a process of determinate negation 
(SL 603/W6, 277-8). Adorno’s criticism of Hegel is that, in the final analysis, the requirement of 
the system to establish the ‘identity of identity and non-identity’ betrays its aspiration to concrete 
universality. Particularity and non-identity are sacrificed to the system’s demand for unity.   
What does not tolerate anything which is not like itself, thwarts the reconciliation for 
which it mistakes itself. The act of violence of making others equal to oneself reproduced 
the contradiction which it stamps out. (ND 146)  
The very idea of the whole, as Hegel understands it, claims Adorno, “is a perversion of particu-
larity.”   The unity of the whole is achieved at the price of violence perpetrated against the par50 -
ticulars and that violence, as we shall see, is not just an innocent conceptual violence according 
to Adorno (HTS 27).  
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Many of these criticisms by Adorno of Hegel’s Logic and System are immanent criticisms in the 
slender commonplace sense. Although different in tone, in the form in which they are expressed, 
and in their immediate target, they are of a kind with Trendelenburg’s criticism, mentioned 
above.  
However, Adorno has other criticisms of Hegel, which are of a quite different ilk. This second 
group of criticism reflect Adorno’s peculiar technique of reading philosophy, that he also dis-
plays when interpreting the literary works of Beckett, Kafka and Proust, and which he sums up 
as follows: “What these works say, is not what their words say” (AT 184/GS, 7, 274). By reading 
Hegelian spirit as enciphered social labour, Adorno finds in Hegel an encrypted foil for under-
standing and criticizing contemporary society. Adorno sees in Hegel’s system and the violence it 
perpetrates on particulars (in spite of its aspirations to the contrary) an analogue to the presently 
existing social system and the real violence it perpetrates on individuals. Hegel’s system, he 
claims, provides a model for understanding twentieth century totalitarian society avant la lettre, 
which can help critical theory to unmask and to denounce its mechanisms. 
Satanically, the world as grasped by the Hegelian system, has only now, a hundred and 
fifty years later, proved itself to be a system in the literal sense, namely that of a radically 
societalized society… A world integrated through “production” through the exchange re-
lationship, depends in all its moments on the social conditions of its production, and in 
that sense actually realizes the primacy of the whole over its parts, in this regard the des-
perate impotence of every single individual now verifies Hegel’s extravagant conception 
of the system. (HTS 27/GS5 273) 
We should not be distracted by Adorno’s tendency to conflate the whole part-relation and the 
universal particular-relation in Hegel, nor by the fact he claims these conceptual relations prefig-
ure the social domination of individuals in capitalist society, which seems historically and textu-
ally cavalier. We must focus on the bottom line: Hegel’s philosophy, he writes “sides with the big 
guns.”  It is totalitarian and is complicit with actual totalitarianism. This line of criticism, then, 51
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is anything but an immanent criticism, on either conception of it: it is, at bottom, nothing less 
than a moral and political condemnation. 
16. These, then, are the various reasons why Adorno begins to worry about whether ‘imma-
nent criticism’ is appropriate for his critical social theory, and they are good reasons. My claim is 
not just that Adorno has these worries, but that he is right to. He should not endorse ‘immanent 
criticism’ in either of the two senses as his approach to critical theory of society.  I think that the 
arguments canvassed above are enough to show convincingly that Adorno’s own dialectical can-
not be fundamentally Hegelian, in the sense that he cannot help himself to Hegel’s own dialecti-
cal method, nor to its component ideas.  
Moreover, I believe that on rare occasions, in his mature work, Adorno comes to the same real-
ization. Adorno realizes that given his critique of Hegel, and given austere negativism, he must 
either give the notion of determinate negation, or completely revise it, such that it no longer the 
Hegelian presuppositions he rejects. For example, at one point Adorno claims that an “anti-di-
alectical principle” governs “the inmost core of dialectics.” (ND 158/GS 6, 161) The principle 
Adorno has in mind is the Hegelian thesis “that the negation of the negation is positive” which, 
he claims is an affirmation that “cannot be sustained” (LND, 17).  He realizes that what makes a 
negation determinate according to Hegel, i.e. what gives rise to something new, and not just new 
but something better and higher, is its being a moment in the development of the absolute idea.  
Adorno tends to isolate as an “anti-dialectical principle” the idea that the second negation, the 
negation of the negation yields a positive result. “The thesis that the negation of a negation is 
something positive can only be upheld by one who presupposes positivity – as all-conceptuality 
– from the beginning.” (ND160/GS 6, 162) In fact, as we have seen, it is Hegel’s idea of nega-
tion, tout court that presupposes positivity. This means that Adorno must devise a conception of 
determinate negation that is quite different from Hegel’s, and which does not rely on the “posi-
tive postulate…of spirit in which everything is included” if he is to succeed in his aim (LND, 
17). In my view, Adorno comes to the realization of why a new conception of the grounds of de-
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terminacy of determinate negation is needed, but never manages to develop an adequate solution. 
He does however make two attempts in this direction. 
17. The first is where he canvasses a notion of the false as an ‘index of itself and of the true’ 
in explicit contrast to Spinoza’s conception of the true. Spinoza’s view, which, incidentally 
Adorno claims to be “characteristic of identity philosophy”  - the kind of philosophy Adorno op-
poses – is that “the true and the false can both be directly read off from the true.” Adorno’s coun-
terproposal is that the true can be read off  “the false, that which should not be” (LND, 29). This 
move does not work though. The reason is that, as Theunissen convincingly argued decades ago, 
Adorno has a quasi-medical idea of the false, qua what ought not to be, where the false is bad 
because it is a pathology or corruption. Such a notion of falsity depends upon an implicit prior 
notion of truth qua health or wholeness, for pathological notions of illness are parasitic on prior 
notions of health.  And the latter are inherently positive notions.  Hence Adorno’s own notions 52
of the false and the bad depend illicitly on positive ideas of the true (and the good). In relaxed 
and offhand moments of reflection, Adorno recognizes this too. For example he writes in a letter 
to Thomas Mann “if it is true that the power of the positive has passed into the negative, it is no 
less true that negation draws its rights solely from the power of the positive.”  53
The second attempt is where Adorno proposes that criticism works like homeopathy. On this 
view, reason that wounds also heals. Thus in Negative Dialectics Adorno claims: “Concepts 
alone can bring about what the concept prevents, cognition is a τρώσας ỉάσεται.’  At times, he 54
writes as if the mimetic moment in (some) works of modern art can work in this quasi-medicinal 
way.  At others, he suggests that critique can do this. However, the mere assertion that determi55 -
nate negation, or more broadly, immanent criticism can work like homeopathic remedies is not 
convincing. Homoepathic remedies succeed (insofar as they do) by stimulating immune respons-
es that cure illness and thus promote bodily health and well-being, but the latter are positive 
normative notions that have no place in Adorno’s austerely negativist critical theory.  
18.  I submit that neither of these two related attempts to work out an alternative conception of 
determinate negation, and by extension, also of immanent criticism, succeeds. They fail for very 
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similar reasons: the model of falsity as pathology is reliant on prior positive notions. It is thus 
inconsistent with austere negativism. And it fails to provide an adequate account of the determi-
nacy of determinate negation that could substitute for the Hegelian account, which Adorno re-
jects. Indeed, they are not arguments or solutions so much as motifs, ideas that flicker into life 
momentarily in Adorno’s writings, and which have the merit of reflecting light on the to the real 
theoretical problems confronting Adorno.  
Of course it could be, that were Adorno to come up with a viable alternative account of the de-
terminacy of determinate negation, which was compatible with both his critique of Hegel and his 
austere negativism, this would still undermine the Continuity Thesis, for such radically revised 
and recalibrated notions of ‘dialectic’, ‘determinate negation’ and ‘Aufhebung’ would resemble 
their Hegelian ancestors in name only. In which case Adorno still could not claim with any sem-
blance of validity that his own arguments against Hegel fulfill the postulate of “determinate 
negation” or that they defend “Hegel’s own’ dialectic against him. As things presently stand, that 
claim, and indeed the entire Continuity Thesis rests on the unreliable basis of some of the things 
Adorno says, which are inconsistent with what at his most insightful he is willing to acknowl-
edge, but which, as one who does not value consistency that highly as a theoretical virtue, is nev-
ertheless unwilling to retract. 
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